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PURPOSES AND EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL LAW 
Samuel W. Buell∗ 
n their provocative Article “Mediating Rules in Criminal Law,” 
Professors Richard Bierschbach and Alex Stein tell us that rules 
of criminal liability and rules of evidence, often pushing in oppos-
ing directions, collectively determine the quantum and mix of de-
terrence and retribution that a given punishment practice delivers.1 
An example could be the excuse defense of duress. This doctrine is 
designed to prevent punishment of some actors who are not mor-
ally at fault for their behavior (or at least comparatively less at 
fault than others) because forces not of their own making (and 
about which we have some sympathy) drive them to commit so-
cially harmful acts. The doctrine might undermine deterrence by 
granting actors permission, past a point, to abandon efforts to resist 
offending. However, the evidentiary rule in most jurisdictions that 
requires the defendant to carry the burden of proving an excuse 
defense tilts matters somewhat back towards deterrence. Making 
the defendant prove duress filters out many of the weaker (and 
even fabricated) duress claims, which might arise in cases in which 
a defendant was perfectly capable of resisting pressure to violate. 
 
∗ Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. Many thanks to Sam-
uel Bagenstos, Mitchell Berman, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and Emily Hughes for 
very helpful comments and criticisms. 
1 This essay is a response to Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules 
in Criminal Law, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1197 (2007). 
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Bierschbach and Stein urge us to analyze many areas of criminal 
law doctrine with this methodology. 
Their effort is an intriguing forward move in criminal law schol-
arship that seeks to remove barriers—perhaps of use to lawyers 
and law teachers—that have impeded full understanding of the sys-
tem of social regulation and practices that produces punishment. In 
a variety of styles and methodologies, scholars have been opening 
our eyes to how classification-driven distinctions between substan-
tive criminal law and criminal procedure, liability rules and eviden-
tiary rules, law and social norms, and law and politics block us from 
clearly viewing the social practice of punishment.2 
As I worked with Bierschbach and Stein’s methodology, how-
ever, I became convinced that it is flawed. The approach requires 
us to force components of doctrine onto the authors’ deterrence-
retribution ledger, yet, we can see as we are doing this that many of 
those components do not belong there. By the time we are done, 
we cannot escape the conclusion that the ledger itself is too 
wooden and simple to account accurately for the theoretical struc-
ture of a given locus of criminal law doctrines. 
The only option this conclusion leaves is to see Bierschbach and 
Stein’s analytical framework as an “as-if” tool for the criminal law: 
measure and examine a doctrine’s effects with a binary deterrence-
retribution scale, but disregard a doctrine’s purposes or other ef-
fects. Such a deliberately artificial stance could only be useful for 
the normative implications that the authors say are subsidiary to 
the positive aims of their project. But the normative value of this 
posture appears doubtful. Their description of a struggle over pub-
lic policy between advocates of deterrence and retribution is not 
likely to be accurate if their binary framework for punishment’s 
justifications proves to be overly simplified. If the framework of 
Bierschbach and Stein’s thesis fits neither doctrine nor politics, it is 
 
2 See, e.g., David A. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporary Society (2001); Larry Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Es-
say in Legal Epistemology (2006); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the 
Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463 (2004); Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Cor-
porate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295 
(2001); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. 
Rev. 349 (1997); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Pro-
cedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1 (1997). 
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not likely to meet their aspirations of changing scholarly analysis or 
redirecting public debate. 
I will illustrate my disquiet with Bierschbach and Stein’s positive 
account by discussing two areas of doctrine that they offer to sup-
port their thesis. I will then explain why I think their analysis, even 
if considered solely in terms of doctrine’s surface and effects, does 
not seem promising as a means of advancing normative debate. 
Consider their account of perjury law.3 As a normative matter, 
most would agree that all lies, even all lies under oath, are not 
equally condemnable. Bierschbach and Stein sensibly assert that 
retributive objectives would counsel punishing only serious lies 
that pervert legal processes. Perjury statutes punish much more: es-
sentially any intentionally uttered falsehood that is even hypotheti-
cally material. Many jurisdictions, however, narrow the reach of 
this rule by requiring the prosecutor to supply corroborating evi-
dence in perjury cases. Bierschbach and Stein see this as an exam-
ple of a retributive countermeasure in evidence law to a deterrence 
measure in the substantive law of liability. They say the corrobora-
tion rule cuts back the class of cases in which liability will be im-
posed to something more like those with serious lies.4 
This account ignores that legislatures and courts have created 
and interpreted corroboration requirements in perjury law for 
other reasons entirely. These requirements serve two purposes, 
both utilitarian: first, they guard against erroneous convictions in 
cases that often turn on elusive matters such as the defendant’s 
knowledge, intent, and memory while testifying, and involve easily 
fabricated claims by accusers of the A-said-B-said variety; and sec-
ond, they reduce the risk of overdeterring voluntary testimony, 
which is a socially valuable activity.5 
It might turn out that perjury cases that fail for lack of sufficient 
corroboration just tend to be perjury cases that involve less 
blameworthy lies. But we do not know this empirically and proba-
bly could not easily find it out, since most of the cases that fail for 
insufficient corroboration are cases that prosecutors decline to 
charge. The more significant problem is that Bierschbach and 
Stein’s analytical framework is artificial. In considering law that 
 
3 Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 1, at 1213–15. 
4 Id. at 1215–16. 
5 See Weiler v. United States, 332 U.S. 606, 608–10 (1945). 
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counteracts a liability rule, they limit themselves to the law of evi-
dence. I do not see why their claim about proper perspective on 
conduct rules should not extend to examining all applicable deci-
sion rules, as even some of Bierschbach and Stein’s doctrinal ex-
amples suggest.6 Once we take this step, however, we see that the 
argument that we should confine our perspective to the surface and 
effects of doctrine, while overlooking its development and pur-
poses, proves too much. If a liability rule looks like it administers a 
strong dose of deterrence, then any rule that narrows liability can 
be deemed to have “retributive” countereffects. It could as easily 
be said that the right to unfettered cross-examination makes per-
jury law “less retributively overbroad” by increasing the likelihood 
that a defendant will persuade a jury to side with the defendant in a 
battle of A-said-B-said. 
Now consider how the thesis works when applied to accomplice 
liability rules, another of their doctrinal areas.7 To deter joint ef-
forts to break the law, accomplice liability rules cast a very wide 
net (most any form of assistance triggers full liability for the of-
fense assisted) and are very punitive (in most jurisdictions, the pun-
ishment for helping is the same as for doing). Bierschbach and 
Stein identify a number of procedural and evidentiary doctrines as 
retributivist countermoves to these expansive liability rules. 
As with their account of perjury law, the countermoves they de-
scribe are “retributive” only in the sense of lowering the probabil-
ity that liability will be imposed under an otherwise highly deter-
rent rule. They discuss rules that make it difficult for the state to 
force accomplices to testify, require redaction of self-incriminating 
statements to protect co-defendants, and dictate the severance of 
co-defendants in some trials involving such statements. These pro-
cedural doctrines are rooted in theories of self-incrimination pro-
tections, none of which have to do with countering broad liability 
rules.8 They further discuss rules in many jurisdictions that require 
corroboration of accomplice testimony. Like the corroboration re-
quirement in perjury law, these rules are justified by goals of reli-
 
6 Some of what they discuss as evidence law (for example, the burden of proof ap-
plicable to defenses) can as easily be situated within doctrines of criminal procedure. 
7 Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 1, at 1218–26. 
8 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 
1227, 1232–42 (1988) (reviewing theories of self-incrimination). 
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ability and accuracy, not by a goal of limiting the scope of accom-
plice liability. Bierschbach and Stein talk about the Supreme Court 
recently making it harder to admit “testimonial” hearsay under the 
Sixth Amendment (which, in some circumstances, may include 
statements of accomplices).9 But in that context the Court was 
working out the fundamental and inviolable components of the 
trial right, not worrying about the scope of accessorial liability. 
Bierschbach and Stein’s idea that some of these limitations, 
whatever their origins, supply accomplices with bargaining chips in 
negotiating plea agreements, thereby reducing the force of acces-
sorial liability rules, is empirically doubtful. Those who represent 
accomplices—in dealings with the federal government at least—
would attest that leverage comes entirely from information and 
(lawyers would lament) is virtually nonexistent in the law. 
Some of Bierschbach and Stein’s examples do not comfortably 
fit their theory because the theory itself does not fit with the pun-
ishment system it seeks to explain. Deterrence is one objective that 
might be pursued in a consequentialist program for punishment. 
But there are others, of course. These include minimizing the social 
costs of punishment—including the costs, of all types, that can fol-
low from mistaken punishment of persons who did not commit the 
act in question, as well as from punishment of persons who com-
mitted the act but who are not blameworthy. Consequentialist aims 
also include exploiting the communicative and educative force of 
punishment practices. 
Retribution is “purely” an objective probably only for a small 
subset of theorists who believe that punishment exists so that soci-
ety can impose desert on those who are morally at fault, full stop. 
People are much more apt to be “negative” retributivists. Such 
persons believe that the criminal justice system exists to improve 
society (or at least to prevent it from getting worse) and that con-
siderations of fault act as a moral constraint on the state’s ability to 
accomplish social objectives through punishment. Put another way:  
punish if it is useful and worth the cost, but not if it would unde-
servedly harm a person. 
One of Bierschbach and Stein’s intriguing assertions is that there 
is an “asymmetry” between the deterrent and retributive effects of 
 
9 Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 1, at 1223. 
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evidence rules, because a deterrence advocate cares about the dis-
tribution of errors between false convictions and false acquittals 
while an advocate of retributivism simply wishes that the sum of 
errors in both directions be minimized.10 Bierschbach and Stein 
(candidly stating that they choose not to explore the complexities 
of retributivism) do not deal with the claim that wrongful state im-
position of punishment is a greater evil than an offender’s wrongful 
avoidance of punishment—likely the claim of many persons con-
cerned principally with individual moral fault. If a retributivist does 
care about the distribution of errors, then she will not find asym-
metry in evidence rules to be welcome. Holding the total error rate 
constant, she would prefer a rule that generates more false nega-
tives than false positives to one generating more false positives 
than false negatives. 
By eschewing (quite purposely, they say) historical and etiologi-
cal questions about the mechanisms of their “mediating rules,” 
Bierschbach and Stein fall prey to the simplicity of their own thesis. 
The truth is that a given locus of conduct rules and decision rules in 
the criminal law should be seen not as engaging in a tug-of-war, but 
as pushing in a variety of directions in service of numerous social 
objectives, many of which are not at all in conflict with each other. 
Bierschbach and Stein might be saying something else that is not 
affected by my criticism. They might be urging us to disregard in-
tentionally stories that lie below the surface of the rules. Look at a 
criminal law doctrine, they might instruct, and just score it between 
its discouragement of prohibited acts and its limitations on pun-
ishment of persons who are not blameworthy. In doing so, consider 
only inputs and outputs. What did the people who went into the 
system do? Among those, which ones were punished at the end? 
I can see only one purpose in assuming this posture. It cannot be 
of positive value if—as I have shown and would expect to continue 
to find if I kept at it—doing so requires describing many aspects of 
the law as things they are not. It might be of normative value, how-
ever, if (as Bierschbach and Stein suggest in their brief concluding 
discussion) it would accurately tell two camps in a debate how 
much policy currency each was receiving from its government. Bet-
ter, this binary accounting exercise might move such debate for-
 
10 Id. at 1202. 
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ward by convincing participants that they were getting more than 
they had thought. 
This benefit could only be realized if Bierschbach and Stein’s bi-
nary deterrence-retribution scale, whatever its deficits in describing 
criminal law doctrine, nonetheless accurately described the policy 
debate. But if we end up believing that the framework does not 
capture the complexity of justifications for doctrine, why would we 
think it could capture a public debate about those same justifica-
tions? Maybe there is some very significant acoustic separation be-
tween criminal law theory and public beliefs about the criminal law 
(like the one I understand Bierschbach and Stein to see between 
liability rules and allegedly quiet, subterranean evidentiary rules). 
Interesting hypothesis. Exploring this would have required diving 
into the depths of politics in much the same way Bierschbach and 
Stein were unwilling to dive into the depths of doctrine. 
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